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Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel system for selling bundles of news
items. Through the system, customers bargain with the seller over
the price and quality of the delivered goods. The advantage of the
developed system is that it allows for a high degree of exibility in the
price, quality, and content of the oered bundles. The price, quality,
and content of the delivered goods may, for example, dier based on
daily dynamics and personal interest of customers.
Autonomous \software agents" execute the negotiation on behalf of
the users of the system. To perform the actual negotiation these agents
make use of bargaining strategies. We present the novel approach of de-
composing bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto
ecient search strategies. Additionally, we introduce the orthogonal
and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto search strategies. We show
through computer experiments that the use of these Pareto search
strategies will result in very ecient bargaining outcomes. Moreover,
the system is setup such that it is actually in the best interest of the
customer to have their agent adhere to this approach of disentangling
the bargaining strategy.
Personalization of information goods becomes more and more a key com-
ponent of a successful electronic business strategy [1]. The challenge is to
develop systems that can deliver a high level of personalization combined
with, whenever possible, a high adaptability to changing circumstances. In
1this paper we develop a system which can attain these properties through
the manner in which it sells information goods.
We consider the novel approach of selling bundles of news items through
a system that allows for bargaining over the price and quality of the de-
livered goods. Bundling of information goods has many potential benets
including complementarities among the bundle components, and sorting con-
sumers according to their valuation (cf. [2] and the references therein). The
advantage of the developed system is that it allows for a high degree of ex-
ibility in the price, quality, and content of the oered bundles. The price,
quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for example, dier based
on daily dynamics and personal interest of customers.
The system as developed is capable of taking into account business re-
lated constraints. More specically, it tries to ensure that customers perceive
the bargaining outcomes as being \fair" by having customers end up with
equivalent oers whenever that seems fair. Partly because of this fairness
constraint the actual bargaining process is not really one-to-one bargaining
between seller and customer but instead is one-to-many (i.e., between seller
and customers).
To accelerate the negotiation process, customers can initiate concurrent
negotiation threads for the same bundle with dierences in the quality of
the delivered bundles. The thread in which the agreement is reached rst
determines the nal bargaining outcome.
In the developed system, autonomous \software agents" perform (part
of) the negotiation on behalf of the users of the system. These software
agents bargain over a multi-issue price (the price is actually a tari with a
xed and variable component).
To enable ecient multi-issue bargaining outcomes, we present the novel
approach of decomposing the bargaining strategies into concession strate-
gies and Pareto ecient search strategies. Additionally, we introduce the
orthogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto search strategies. We
show through computer experiments that the respective use of these two
Pareto search strategies by the two bargainers will result in very ecient
bargaining outcomes (i.e., these outcomes closely approximate Pareto e-
cient bargaining solutions).
In the system the seller agent uses a Pareto ecient search strategy
(i.e., the orthogonal-DF) combined with a concession strategy. Although
the customer is free to choose other bargaining strategies, the system is set
up such that it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their
agent also use a Pareto ecient search strategy (i.e, the orthogonal strategy)
combined with a concession strategy.
2In Section 1 we discuss the developed system at a more conceptual level.
In Section 2 we discuss the customer and seller agent in greater detail. Fur-
thermore, we discuss the type of bargaining strategies these agents use. In
Section 3 we study in greater detail the Pareto search aspects of bargaining.
Through computer experiments we investigate the eciency of the intro-
duced bargaining approach. (Note that for this purpose it is not necessary
to simulate the entire system as developed, it suces to consider one-to-one
bargaining only.) In Section 4 we discuss the results of the paper and relate
the paper to the relevant literature. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
1 A System for Selling Information Goods
1.1 Problem Statement
The goal is to develop a system for the sales of bundles of news items where
customers bargain over the price and quality of the delivered goods. The
negotiated contract applies to a xed time interval, which is typically a
short period of time, e.g., a single day. There are roughly three possibilities
for implementing when the negotiation process takes place: customers can
negotiate a contract before the news arises, after the news arises, or while
the news arises. The system is set up in such away that all three possibilities
can be implemented.
The value customers attach to news items may uctuate heavily due
to daily dynamics. Moreover, there may be wide dierences in personal
interests of customers. The advantage of the developed system is that it
allows for a high degree of exibility in the price, quality, and content of
the oered bundles. The price, quality and content of the delivered goods
may, for example, dier based on daily dynamics and personal interest of
customers.
1.2 Bundles of Information Goods
The system sells bundles of news items which become available during a
predened and xed time interval (e.g., a day). Within the system, prices
vary based on the content and \quality of service" of the bundle. A bundle
content denes which types of news categories the bundle contains. The
system distinguishes between k categories. Within a category the system
distinguishes between two quality of service levels: i.e., a customer pays a
xed price for either receiving headlines or complete news articles. In the
former case we speak of a category with low quality of service, whereas in
3the latter case we speak of a category with high quality of service. Moreover,
with the quality of service (or just quality) of a bundle we actually mean
the quality of service specied per category.
A customer bargains with the seller over the bundle tari. The negoti-
ated tari is a two-part tari with a xed and variable price. The xed price
(pf) is the price a customer pays for receiving the bundle content with the
specied quality of service. Moreover, the variable price (pv) is the price the
customer pays if she wants to read a full article where the quality of service
only species delivery of the article headline.
Consider, for example, the bundle content religion, culture, and politics,
where the category religion has a high quality of service and the other two
have a low quality of service. Then the customer pays a xed price for
receiving all the full articles in the category religion and only the headlines
of all the articles which do not belong to the category religion but do belong
to the other two categories. Moreover, the variable price is the price the
customer pays whenever she wants to read the full article of a news item
that belongs to the categories culture or politics (and does not belong to the
category religion).
1.3 Bargaining with Software Agents
We employ the paradigm of \software agents", where pieces of autonomous
software perform (part of) the negotiating on behalf of the users of the
system. Customers and seller instruct their agent through a user interface
(UI). The agents conduct the actual negotiation. Figure 1 depicts, at a high
abstraction level, the bargaining process between a customer and the seller.
1.4 Bargaining Process
Bargaining occurs in an alternating exchange of oers and counter oers,
typically initiated by the customer. An oer species the xed price, the
variable price (uniform for all low quality of service categories), the bundle
content, and also the desired quality of service of the information for each
category separately. The bargaining process continues until an agreement
is reached or one of the bargainers terminates the process. Based on this
bargaining process, gure 2 draws the bargaining protocol the customer
agents and seller agent use to do the actual bargaining.
To accelerate the negotiation process, we allow concurrent negotiation
threads for the same bundle content with dierent quality of service. The
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Figure 1: The one-to-one bargaining process
1: propose(Offer,￿ Precondition)
2: abort-bargaining
2: accept-proposal(Offer,￿ Condition)￿
2:￿ propose (Offer, Precondition)
3: abort-bargaining
3: accept-proposal(Offer,￿ Precondition)
3:￿ propose(Offer, Precondition)
Responder￿ =￿ Customer￿ or￿ Seller Initiator￿ =￿ Seller or￿ Customer
￿
Figure 2: The agents bargaining protocol
customer can therefore submit several oers at the same time. In order to
discern between threads, each thread must have a dierent quality congu-
ration for the categories where a quality conguration species the quality
of service for all the bundle categories. The seller can only respond by
varying the xed and variable price. The thread in which the agreement is
reached rst determines the tari and quality conguration for the desired
categories.
51.5 Fairness & One-to-Many Bargaining
A possible drawback of bargaining is that two customers may end up pay-
ing a substantially dierent price for very similar bundles. Customers may
perceive this as unfair. This is an important concern for the seller, since
customers may become dissatised or stop using the system altogether.
In the system a notion of fairness is incorporated into the bargaining
strategy the seller agent uses. More specically, within a limited timeframe
the seller agent makes equivalent oers to customers who are interested
in identical bundles. For oers that specify identical bundles, the actual
tari may still dier from customer to customer. Fairness, however, ensures
that the expected revenue of these taris is identical for all (counter) oers
submitted by the seller agent; the expected revenue (R) of a tari (pf;pv)
for a particular bundle is dened as follows:
R = pf + pv  ; (1)
where  denotes the expected number of articles read in the low quality of
service categories (for the average customer). The expected revenue can,
however, vary through time. The oer equivalence therefore only holds
within a limited time frame. Note that beside \fairness" also other busi-
ness side-constraints may be implemented. The actual way in which side-
constraints, such as fairness, are implemented may be important because
it can alter the strategic behavior of customers. It is however beyond the
scope of the paper to discuss these issues.
The actual bargaining process between seller and customers is not really
one-to-one bargaining between seller and customer but instead is one-to-
many. On the one hand, the seller can use his experience in other ongoing
bargaining processes between customers to adjust his bargaining strategy;
under true one-to-one bargaining the bargaining strategy only depends on
the moves of the direct opponent. On the other hand, fairness and/or other
side-constraints limit the bargaining options of the seller. These limitations
do not apply under true one-to-one bargaining. Figure 3 depicts the one-to-
many bargaining process and the possibility of parallel negotiation threads
between a customer and the seller.
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Figure 3: The one-to-many bargaining with parallel threads
2 Agents & Bargaining
2.1 Agents
2.1.1 Seller agent
Bargaining with a customer is done based on the seller agent's desired aspi-
ration level expressed in expected utils. We dene the expected utility u of
the seller agent as the expected revenue from selling a bundle given pf and
pv (see also equation 1), i.e., u(pf;pv) = pf +pv. We assume that all costs
are sunk, i.e., there are no transaction costs. Recall from section 1.5 that
 denotes the number of expected articles read in the low quality of service
categories. The agent can assess the expected number of articles read based
on, for example, aggregate past sales data.
Due to the fairness constraint, the seller agent cannot charge dierent
prices to dierent individuals for identical bundles (within the same time
frame). The seller agent can indirectly discriminate between dierent cus-
tomers, however, based on dierences in the preferred bundle content and/or
quality of service. In the system, the seller can discriminate by varying for
example the desired expected utility for dierent combinations of quality of
service and bundle content.
72.1.2 Customer Agent
The customer agent acts on behalf of the customer. The customer can
indicate her preferences by specifying, for each information category she is
interested in, the amount of articles she expects to read. The customer
can furthermore select between several negotiation strategies to be used by
the agent and specify a maximum budget bmax. The budget provides the
agent with a mandate for the negotiation; the total expected costs should
not exceed bmax.
Given a tari (pf;pv) for a particular bundle, the customer's expected
utility is dened as u(pf;pv) = bmax   (pf + pv  ). The second part of the
equation is identical to seller's expected revenue (see equation (1)). How-
ever, , the number of expected articles read in the low quality of service
categories, refers now to the expectation of the individual customer. Given
the utility the agent is able to translate the customer's preferences into oers
and also respond to the seller's oers as to maximize the expected utility.
The negotiation protocol allows for multiple negotiation threads for the
same bundle content (see Section 1.4). Given a bundle content with n cate-
gories, in principle 2n threads are possible (by varying the quality of service
for each category). The customer agent, however, selects only a limited
number of combinations based on the customer's preferences, to reduce the
amount of communication. In the current system the customer agent initi-
ates n+1 threads. In the rst thread the quality of service for all categories
is set to low. In the second thread, only the quality of service for the cat-
egory with the highest expected articles read is set to high. In the third
thread, this is done for the two categories with the rst and second high-
est expected articles read, and so on. Within a thread, a xed price and a
variable price are negotiated.
2.2 Decomposing Bargaining Strategy
The customer agents and seller agent contain various bargaining strategies
to do the actual bargaining over the two-part tari. These strategies make
use of the notion of a utility function to represent the bargainers' preferences
for the various taris. We introduce the novel approach of decomposing bar-
gaining strategies into concession strategies and \Pareto search" strategies.
Concession strategies determine what the desired utility level of an oer
will be given a particular sequence of oers and counter oers. Algorithms
that implement Pareto search strategies determine, given a particular utility
level and a particular history of oers and counter oers, what the multi-
8issue oer will be, i.e., the xed price pf and the variable price pv of the two
part tari. In terms of a multivariable utility function a counter oer entails
both a movement o the iso-utility line and a movement along the iso-utility
line. (Given a specied utility level, an iso-utily line species all the pf and
pv points which generate identical utility.) Concession strategies determine
the movement of an iso-utility line; Pareto search strategies determine the
movement along an iso-utility line.
Pareto search strategies aim at reaching agreement as soon as the re-
spective \concession" strategies permit this. Therefore it may be good for
both parties to use it. In more economic terms a negotiated tari is called
Pareto ecient if it is impossible to change the tari without making one of
the bargainers worse o, i.e., one of the bargainers will always attach a lower
(or equal) utility to the adjusted tari. From a system design perspective
Pareto eciency of the negotiated taris is clearly desirable.
In Section 2.3 we introduce a particular class of Pareto search algo-
rithms. The experiments in Section 3 show that if the seller agent uses this
Pareto search algorithm and customer agents use a similar Pareto search
algorithm, then the bargaining outcome will closely approximate a Pareto
ecient solution given a wide variety of concession strategies.
In the system the seller agent uses an instance of the Pareto ecient
search algorithms combined with a concession strategy. Although a customer
is free to select other bargaining strategies the system is set up such that it
is actually in the best interest of customers to have their agents use Pareto
search strategies combined with a concession strategy. We elaborate on this
issue in the discussion in Section 4.
2.3 Orthogonal Strategy & DF
Both customer agent and seller agent may use| what we call| an orthogo-
nal strategy as the Pareto search algorithm. This strategy is probably best
explained through an example. Suppose, the customer (with whom the seller
bargains over the tari) placed the tth oer of (pf(t);pv(t)). Moreover, the
seller's concession strategy dictates an aspiration level of Us(t + 1): i.e., in
utils the (counter) oer should be worth Us(t+1). Based on this information
the orthogonal strategy determines (pf(t+1);pv(t+1)), the counter oer of
the seller, by choosing a (pf;pv) combination that generates Us(t + 1) utils
and lies closest (measured in Euclidean distance) to the point (pf(t);pv(t)).
Figure 4 gives the graphical representation of the orthogonal strategy.
The use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties results in a mapping
f from a bargainer's aspiration level at t to the aspiration level at t + 2.
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Given convex preferences (cf. [11]) and xed aspiration levels the mapping
f can be shown to satisfy the Lipschitz condition jjf(x)   f(y)jj  jjx   yjj
for all x and y in the domain of f.1 Thus, given xed aspiration levels and
convex preferences, the orthogonal strategy does imply that consecutive of-
fers do not diverge. (Note, that convex preferences do not rule out changing
preferences it only means that at some point in time|i.e., during the bar-
gaining process| the preference relation is convex.) Figure 5 illustrates the
use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties for the case of tangent iso-
utlity lines. It draws a sequence of two oers and counter oers with convex
preferences and a xed aspiration level. (Us and Uc denote the iso-utility
lines of the seller and customer, respectively.) The gure illustrates, for in-
stance, how the seller's oer at time 1 (with aspiration level Uc(1) = Uc) is
transformed into an oer at time 3 (with aspiration level Uc(3) = Uc).
The use of just the orthogonal strategy by both parties may lead to very
slow convergence to Pareto ecient bargaining outcomes. To speed up the
convergence process we can add an amplifying mechanism to the orthogonal
strategy. As the amplifying mechanism we use the derivative follower with
adaptive step-size (ADF). (Henceforth we will call this the orthogonal-DF.)
The derivative follower (DF) is a local search algorithm (cf. [9]). It adjust
the variable price pv found by the orthogonal strategy by either subtracting
or adding  to it depending on the result of the previous two adjustments,
where  is called the step-size of the DF. Consequently also the xed price
pf changes because the adjusted oer still needs to generate the same utility
1The proof is a straightforward application of convex analysis (cf. [15]) given that
without loss of generality we can assume that the preferences are bounded. That is,
negative and extremely high (pf(t);pv(t)) combinations can be discarded, without loss of
generality.
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Figure 5: Sequence of two o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ers with 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levels and convex preferences, where (p
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v) denotes a Pareto Ecient tari.
level (specied by the concession strategy). The dierence between ADF
and DF is that the step-size  becomes adaptive [4, 14]. We use the ADF
proposed by [14]. Intuitively, the idea is to increment the step-size relatively
far away from a Pareto ecient solution and decrement it in the vicinity of a
Pareto ecient solution. Consequently, a quicker and more accurate search
of the solution space becomes possible. Algorithm 1 species the orthogonal-
DF in greater detail and gure 6 illustrates the use of the orthogonal-DF by
the seller (the customer uses the orthogonal strategy only).
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Figure 6: Sequence of two oers and counter oers with xed aspiration
levels where the seller uses the orthogonal-DF and the customer only uses
the orthogonal strategy.
11Algorithm 1 The orthogonal-DF algorithm
The following is given: (a) the opponent's last and before last oer O1 =
(pf(t);pv(t)) and O2 = (pf(t   2);pv(t   2)) respectively, (b) bargainer's
utility function u(pf;pv) and next aspiration level U(t+1), (c) the step-size
, and (d) the search direction sdr 2 f 1;+1g. Based on this information
the orthogonal-DF computes the next counter oer O = (pf(t+1), pv(t+1)).
1. Use the orthogonal strategy to compute O0
1 = (p0
f(t);p0
v(t)) and O0
2 =
(p0
f(t 2);p0
v(t 2)), i.e., the points in the (pf;pv) plane which generate
U(t + 1) utils and lie closest to O1 and O2, respectively.
2. Compute d1 and d2 the distance of the opponent's last two oers, i.e.,
d1 = jjO1 O0
1jj and d2 = jjO2 O0
2jj (jjjj denotes Euclidian distance).
3. Update sdr. Whenever d1 > d2 the orthogonal-DF \turns", i.e., sdr =
 1  sdr, otherwise sdr = sdr.
4. Update . Decrease  whenever the orthogonal-DF turns. For a num-
ber of periods directly after a turn  is not increased, and otherwise 
is increased (cf. [14] for the details).
5. Compute the counter oer O = (pf(t + 1), pv(t + 1)). Set pv(t + 1) =
p0
v(t) +   sdr. Next choose pf(t + 1) such that given pv(t + 1) the
counter oer generate U(t + 1) utils.
123 Experimental Setup & Results
The previous sections outlined the general system for selling bundles of news
items to several customers through negotiation. As discussed in Section 2.2,
negotiation essentially consists of two strategic aspects: the concession of the
agents and the Pareto search method. In this section we focus on the latter
aspect of the negotiations. By means of computer experiments we investi-
gate the eectiveness and robustness of the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF
approach to nd Pareto-ecient solutions for a wide variety of settings. We
evaluate the robustness of the search strategy by experimenting with various
concession strategies on the customer side.
Although the system enables customers to initiate several concurrent
negotiation threads, within a thread the Pareto search strategy operates
independently from the other threads. For researching the eciency and
robustness of Pareto ecient search strategies it therefore suces to consider
only a single negotiation thread in the experiments.
Furthermore, the bundle content in the experimental setup consists of a
single category with a low quality of service. The experimental results gen-
eralize to negotiations involving multiple categories: Only the shape of the
iso-utility curves is aected by the number of categories. In the experiments
the shape is varied using dierent parameter settings.
A general specication of the customer agents and the seller agent was
provided in Section 2. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe the agent settings which
are specically used within the experimental setup. In particular the agents'
preferences and concession strategies are specied in detail in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 respectively. The experimental results are discussed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Agent Preference Settings
We simulate the negotiation with a variety of customer and seller preferences,
expressed by the agents' utility functions. The customer agent's expected
utility depends on  the total number of articles the customer expects to
read in the low quality of service categories (see also Section 2.1.2). The
value  is assumed to be a constant, set randomly between 1 and 20 at
the beginning of the experiment. Note that this results in a linear iso-
utility curve in the (pf;pv) plane (see e.g. Fig. 5). Furthermore, since the
purpose is to demonstrate the eciency of the nal deals reached, we set
the customer agent's mandate bmax for the bundle such that an agreement
is always reached.
The expected utility (i.e., expected revenue) for the seller agent is based
13on  the expected number of articles which the customers will read on av-
erage in the low quality categories. In contrast to the customer agent, the
expectation is not a constant but a function of the variable price pv. It is
assumed that customers who are willing to pay a high variable price are ex-
pected to read less than customers with a low variable price (i.e. we assume
the law of demand holds cf. [11]). In the experiments we use the linear
function (pv) = b   a  pv with b = 20 and a set randomly between 0:03
and 0:07 at the beginning of an experiment. Note that the seller's iso-utility
curve is now convex (towards the origin).
3.2 Concession Strategies
The customers and the seller can each select their own concession strategies.
Although a seller's concession in the main system can depend on the behavior
of all customers (i.e., one-to-many), in the experiments the seller agent's
strategy is simply to decrease the desired utility level or aspiration level
with a xed amount each round. The initial aspiration level is randomly
varied. Note that the number of customers and their behavior does not
aect the seller's concession when this strategy is used.
On the customer side, on the other hand, we implemented four classes
of concession strategies to investigate the robustness of the Pareto search
strategy:
 Hardhead. The customer agent does not concede when this strategy is
used; the aspiration level remains the same during the negotiations.
 Fixed. A xed amount c in utils is conceded each round.
 Fraction. The customer concedes the fraction  of the dierence be-
tween the current desired utility level and the utility of the opponent's
last oer.
 Tit-for-tat. This strategy mimics the concession behavior of the op-
ponent, based on subjective utility improvement. If the utility level
of the seller's oers increases, the same amount is conceded by the
customer. Note that it is the increment in the utility level perceived
by the customer. The seller's actual concession is shielded from the
customer agent, as an improvement could also occur when the seller
moves along his iso-utility curve. Furthermore, note that the perceived
utility improvement could also be negative. To make the concession
behavior less chaotic, no negative concessions are made by the cus-
tomer.
14Concession Random Orthogonal/DF DF/DF
strategy search search search
hardhead 18.92 8.03 18.63
(23:56) (11:44) (32:81)
xed
(c = 20)
26.52 10.43 28.82
(34:49) (17:34) (46:71)
xed
(c = 40)
38.91 16.21 44.29
(49:72) (23:84) (69:76)
xed
(c = 80)
42.12 25.61 48.84
(56:88) (38:72) (72:12)
fraction
( = 0:025)
30.26 10.07 32.25
(38:37) (15:03) (52:81)
fraction
( = 0:05)
31.53 11.52 28.52
(40:00) (16:16) (52:13)
fraction
( = 0:1)
37.81 16.91 26.28
(48:82) (30:80) (42:20)
tit-for-
tat
72.78 59.60 56.64
(121:35) (113:27) (116:82)
Table 1: Average distance from Pareto-ecient solution for various customer
concession strategies (rows) and customer/seller search strategies (columns).
Results are averaged over 500 experiments with random parameter settings.
Standard deviations are indicated between brackets. Best results (see col-
umn Orthogonal=DF) are obtained if the customer and seller use orthogonal
search, and the seller's search is amplied with a derivative follower.
3.3 Results
The seller and the customer in the experiments negotiate in an alternating
fashion until an agreement is reached. The eciency of the agreement is
then evaluated based on the distance of the nal oer from a Pareto-ecient
solution. We measure an oer's distance from a Pareto-ecient solution as
the maximum possible utility improvement for the customer if a Pareto-
ecient oer was made, all else remaining equal.
To evaluate the quality of the results we compare the outcomes using
various search strategies and concession strategies of the customer. Table 1
provides an overview of the results. The row labeled Random contains the
outcomes when both seller and customer use a random search strategy. This
strategy selects a random point on the iso-utility curve2. The distance of
2Only the downward sloping part of the seller's iso-utility curve is used.
15the nal oer when random search is used, lies between 1 and 3 percent of
the total costs.
Although the ineciency with random search is only small compared to
the total costs, even better results are obtained when one bargainer (typ-
ically the customer) uses orthogonal search and the other (the seller) uses
orthogonal-DF (i.e., orthogonal search combined with a derivative follower).
The results are shown in the column labeled Orthogonal=DF of Table 1.
The improvements are considerable. The distance of the nal oer as a
percentage of total costs lies then, for almost all concession strategies, be-
tween 0 and 1. Only for the tit-for-tat strategy the distance lies around 1:8
percent. Notice that the Orthogonal/Orthogonal-DF strategy combination
is also robust, as best results are obtained using this strategy, relatively
independent of the concession strategy selected by the customer.
Table 1 also shows the results if both customer and seller use orthogonal-
DF search (column DF=DF). These results are very similar to random,
however. The derivative follower relies on a consistent response from the
opponent to signal the right direction. If both use a derivative follower, this
signal is distorted.
Notice that the average distance depends on the concession strategy used
by the customer. Although in individual cases Pareto ecient agreements
(with zero distance) are reached using the orthogonal/DF search, the average
distance consistently shows some (usually slight) ineciencies, even when
the customer makes no concessions (i.e., the hardhead strategy). The reason
for this is twofold. Firstly, the DF accelerates nding the ecient solution
by making at times large steps on the iso-utility curve. At a certain point
the algorithm passed the Pareto-ecient point, and then turns. This way
the oers keep oscillating around the optimal point. If the concessions are
suciently large, an agreement can be reached at a point which is less than
optimal.
Secondly, the direction and step-size of the DF are based on changes in
the Euclidean distance between the seller and customer oers through time.
The distance can be inuenced by both concessions and movements along
the iso-utility curve. As the opponent's iso-utility curve is unknown, the
agents are unable to distinguish between the two. This can mislead the DF
whenever concessions are very large. Two possible solutions are to make
either small concessions, or have intervals with no concessions allowing the
search algorithm to nd the best deal.
Particularly tit-for-tat results in a relatively high ineciency, because of
the reasons described above. Recall that tit-for-tat uses a subjective measure
of the opponent's concessions. In practice, the perceived utility increments
16are sometimes quite large, resulting in bursts of very large concessions. If
this occurs near the agreement point this can result in inecient outcomes.
To conclude, the orthogonal/DF strategy clearly outperforms other com-
binations of search strategies in the experiments. Ineciencies still occur,
especially if the concessions are large. A trade-o therefore exists between
reaching an agreement fast (by making large concessions) and reaching an
ecient agreement.
4 Discussion
4.1 The System Revisited
In the paper, we focus on the problem of selling bundles of news items.
Clearly, other types of (information) goods can also be sold through the
developed system. A key question for extending the use of the system to
other application areas is, however, if customers and (to a lesser degree)
sellers are willing to have (autonomous) agents do the actual bargaining for
them. A prerequisite would be that the traded goods have a relatively low
value and transactions are conducted frequently. Consequently, the risks are
low and an agent has a lot of opportunities to learn from past experience
and gradually improve performance. Note that the negotiation procedure of
the system does not require both seller and customer to use the same level
of automation. Depending on the particular application of the system, it
may be desirable for the customer to rely more or less on the assistant of
the software agent.
An additional important aspect of the relevance to other application
areas is the potential benet of using such a system. The developed system
appears particular suitable for selling (bundles) of goods with a high degree
of personalization given relatively rapidly changing preferences (as is the
case with the news items). More specically, in the system personalization
entails discriminating between customers based on the bundle price and the
quality of service. Second-degree price discrimination is the economic term
for this type of personalization.
In second-degree price discrimination the price depends on the quan-
tity and/or quality of the purchased good. The distinguishing aspect of
second-degree price discrimination is that customers can self-select the best
purchase. Traditionally, customers are oered a menu of options where a
tari assigns a price to the option in the menu. The work of [3, 8] discusses
algorithms which| given a particular tari structure| learn the best taris
on-line. They conclude that (especially in a dynamic environment) complex
17taris are generally not the most protable strategy.
The distinguishing aspect of the developed system is that instead of hav-
ing explicit taris customers can bargain for the most appropriate bundle
tari combination. This can result in a similar (or even higher) degree of
discrimination between customers as with explicit complex tari. In the
absence of an explicit tari structure the seller is, however, more exible in
the degree to which she discriminates. The seller does not have to a priori
limit the complexity of the tari structure. Whenever bundles of (informa-
tion) goods are being oered, an additional advantage is that, by initiating
the negotiation process, customers can explicitly express their interest in
a particular bundle of goods. This may facilitate the process of oering
customers the appropriate bundles (and consequently it may facilitate the
discrimination between customers).
Possibly, bargaining leads to price discrimination based on customers'
bargaining skills and not on their preferences. In the developed system this
possibility is, however, reduced signicantly by the fairness constraint in
particular and the fact that bargaining is actually one-to-many in general.
4.2 Bargaining & Pareto Eciency
In the system the seller agent uses the orthogonal-DF as the Pareto search
strategy combined with a concession strategy. The concession strategy de-
termines the next concession relatively independently of the ongoing bar-
gaining process with a particular customer. The idea is that, on the one
hand, bargaining with a particular customer should lead to nding the best
possible deal for both parties, given the seller's desired utility level. That is,
the bargaining outcome should closely approximate a Pareto ecient solu-
tion. On the other hand, the one-to-many aspect of the bargaining process
(i.e., bargaining with more than one customer) should guide the updating of
the concession strategy. Thus the seller uses the disentanglement of the bar-
gaining strategy (in a concession and Pareto search strategy) to distinguish
explicitly between the one-to-many and one-to-one aspects of the bargaining
process.
The experiments in Section 3 show that if a customer agent uses an or-
thogonal strategy as the Pareto ecient search strategy then the bargaining
outcomes will closely approximate a Pareto ecient solution. The experi-
ments are conducted for a variety of (customer) concession strategies, cus-
tomer preferences, and seller preferences. Based on the experimental results
we can conclude that any other strategy choice of a customer will probably
result in less ecient outcomes. Moreover such a strategy will not inuence
18the concession strategy of the seller (due to the independence of the con-
cession strategy). Consequently, any alternative bargaining strategy of the
customer is probably at most as good as the orthogonal strategy combined
with a concession strategy that mimics the concessions of the alternative
strategy. Thus, given the seller's choice of the orthogonal-DF combined
with a relatively independent concession strategy, it is in a customer's best
interest to choose the orthogonal search strategy combined with a conces-
sion strategy. Moreover, this choice results in (a close approximation of) a
Pareto ecient solution.
4.3 Related Work
Related to our work, in [7] a heuristic approach to nding win-win trade-os
between issues is introduced. Contracts which are similar to the opponent's
oer are selected based on fuzzy similarity criteria. Their approach, how-
ever, is applied to additive utility functions with independent issues. The
orthogonal search method, on the other hand, operates on a more general
class of utility functions, which is widely accepted in the economic literature
as a reasonable representation for ones preferences.3 Additionally, with an
orthogonal search method no (domain-specic) similarity function needs to
be specied.
Another approach increasingly used to automate one-to-many negotia-
tions is through auctions. Traditionally, auctions have focused on price as
the single dimension of the negotiation. Recently, however, multi-attribute
auctions have received increasing attention [5, 12]. Although our system
has characteristics similar to those of auctions, bundling and negotiation of
information goods have distinct properties which impede the use of current
available auction designs. Mainly, a bundle is not sold just once, but can be
sold to any number of customers in parallel, with varying contents and con-
gurations. The buyers are also unaware of other buyers in the system and
their oers; they perceive the negotiation to be one-on-one. Furthermore,
we allow both oers and counter oers, whereas auctions typically have less
symmetry.
Rather than via direct negotiation, another way to nd (Pareto) e-
cient solutions for multi-issue problems is through a mediator, see for in-
stance [6, 10, 13]. Both parties need to reveal their preferences to the
mediator. With a mediator, however, trust becomes an important issue.
Furthermore, additional costs are often involved.
3More specically, with convex preferences the approach works particularly well.
195 Concluding Remarks
We developed a novel system for selling bundles of news items. Through the
system, customers bargain over the price and quality of the delivered goods
with the seller. The advantage of the developed system is that it allows for
a high degree of exibility in the price, quality, and content of the oered
bundles. The price, quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for
example, dier based on daily dynamics and personal interest of customers.
The system as developed can take into account business related side-
constraints, such as \fairness" of the bargaining outcomes. Partly due to
these side-constraints (especially fairness) the actual bargaining process be-
tween seller and customers is not really one-to-one bargaining between seller
and customer but instead is one-to-many (i.e., between seller and customers).
Autonomous software agents perform (part of) the negotiation on be-
half of the users of the system. To enable ecient negotiation through these
agents we present the novel approach of decomposing the bargaining strate-
gies into concession strategies and Pareto search strategies. Moreover, we
introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto search
strategies. We show through computer experiments that the respective use
of these two Pareto search strategies by the two bargainers will result in very
ecient bargaining outcomes. Furthermore, the system is setup such that
it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their agent adhere
to this approach of decomposing the bargaining strategy into a concession
strategy and Pareto search strategy.
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